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Population ageing has led to an increasing interest amongst both policy makers and academic 
researchers alike in the consumption and wealth trajectories of individuals and households at older ages. 
The broad issue is one of whether individuals are accumulating enough assets to fund longer retirements, 
but within that overarching issue are a number of other questions relating to the way in which resources 
are accumulated prior to retirement and the degree to which they are drawn upon after retirement. One 
such set of questions relate to housing wealth, the consumption of housing services, and the role that each 
plays in life-cycle accumulation and decumulation trajectories.  
  The empirical study of home-ownership trajectories at older ages has a long history, dating back 
to the first studies of ‘downsizing’ of housing in the US by Merrill (1984) and Venti and Wise (1989, 
1990). Evidence from these and subsequent studies was somewhat mixed with regard to the extent to 
which individuals and households drew down their housing wealth when observed at older ages in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  
  In a recent cross-national comparative study, we examined downsizing in the US and Britain. We 
showed, using the same household data that will be used in this study, that housing downsizing was an 
important part of life for many older households in both countries over the period 1984-2006 (Banks et al. 
2010). Figure 1, taken from that analysis, shows more specifically that amongst those who moved at 
middle and older ages there is, on average, a reduction in the number of rooms in household residences as 
age increases. This reduction is somewhat larger in the United States than in Britain but is apparent in 
both countries, regardless of whether one looks at the raw data or controls for other marital status, family 
size, or employment transitions that occur with age. Other measures of downsizing, such as the change in 
gross house value for movers, demonstrated the same patterns.  
When one looks at the population level rather than only movers, however, the evidence points to 
much less downsizing in Britain than in the US. Figure 2, taken from the same study, shows that across 
all families aged 50 or more downsizing was much less common in Britain compared to the US. The two 
figures together suggest that the main factor underlying lower rates of downsizing in Britain is a much   2
smaller frequency of moving amongst older households in Britain compared to America. This paper aims 
to investigate the reasons for this quite different pattern of residential mobility at older ages in the two 
countries. 
In this paper we document and model housing mobility choices of the middle-aged and elderly in 
Great Britain and the United States. We show that the differential in mobility rates is particularly high 
among renters, indicating that a simple explanation of higher transactions costs for owner-occupier 
movers is unlikely to be the full explanation. Hence, we will examine a number of other potential factors. 
There are several reasons for housing mobility at older ages, including demographic transitions, 
particularly those associated with marital transitions and/or children leaving home, and labor force 
transitions primarily at these ages into retirement. But individuals may also move at older ages to 
consume higher levels of amenities such as a warmer winter climate, or to reduce the cost-of-living. Cost-
of-living factors may include lower housing costs for either renters or owners or lower income taxes.  
  For many factors thought to induce greater mobility at older ages, there may be simply less 
opportunity in Britain to achieve these goals given the much smaller geographical size. Temperature and 
sunshine may exhibit less within-country variation, taxes and other location specific costs may be less 
spatially variable, and the structure of local tax rates may be more uniform in Britain compared to the 
United States. Hence we will document the extent of within-country variation in factors that are believed 
to encourage migration among older people and the degree to which actual moves that are made among 
older people appear to buy better amenities and lower taxes.   
  Higher mobility frictions may also differentiate the two countries. Many British renters have lived 
in council houses for long periods of time at subsidized rents with long waiting lists for new admissions. 
The incentives to remain in place for these people may be quite high. Higher transactions costs may also 
be associated with home ownership in Britain due to stamp taxes on sales of home. Taking into account 
all the factors mentioned in the last few paragraphs, these mobility decisions for renters and owners in 
both countries will be modeled separately in this paper. We will also separately model moves that take   3
place within a British region or US State and those that cross between them, in order to separate out local 
amenity effects from those of national institutional differences. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section I describes the data sources used in both Britain 
and the US. Section II documents the principal facts about differential mobility of older households in 
Britain and the United States and describes their implications for housing consumption at older ages. In 
Section III we summarize the major factors that may produce differential mobility between these two 
countries. Section IV presents the results of models predicting mobility in the two countries for both 
renters and owners. In the final section, our principal conclusions are highlighted. 
 
I.  DATA 
This research will rely on micro-data from the US (the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID)) 
and Britain (the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)). Besides the standard set of demographics on 
age, schooling, family income, marriage and other aspects of family building, information available in all 
these surveys include several aspects of housing choice—ownership, size of house, and value of house.  
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
The PSID has gathered 40 years of extensive economic and demographic data on a nationally 
representative sample of approximately 5,000 (original) families and 35,000 individuals who live in those 
families. Details on family income and its components have been gathered in each wave since the 
inception of PSID in 1969. Starting in 1984 and in five-year intervals until 1999, PSID asked questions to 
measure household wealth. Starting in 1997, the PSID switched to a two-year periodicity, and wealth 
modules are now part of the core interview. Our analysis uses PSID data from the years 1969 to 2005. 
Attrition in the PSID is very low, averaging a few percentage points each wave (Becketti et al., 1988; 
Fitzgerald et al., 1998). 
In each wave, the PSID asks detailed questions on family size and composition, schooling, 
education, age, and marital status. State of residence is available in every year and individuals are   4
followed to new locations if they move. Unlike other American wealth surveys, PSID is representative of 
the complete age distribution. Yearly housing tenure questions determine whether individuals own, rent, 
or live with others. Questions on value and mortgage were asked in each wave of the PSID. Renters are 
asked the rent they pay, and both owners and renters are asked the number of rooms in the residence. In 
this paper, we use PSID data for the years 1969 through 2005. 
British Household Panel Survey—BHPS 
The BHPS has been running annually since 1991 and, like the PSID, is also representative of the 
complete age distribution. The wave 1 sample consisted of some 5,500 households and 10,300 
individuals. The BHPS contains annual information on individual and household income and employment 
as well as a complete set of demographic variables and has several other features to recommend it. There 
is an extensive amount of information on mortgages and housing (including number of rooms) that 
enables us to measure housing wealth in each wave of the data.
1 Regional variation in ownership and 
housing wealth accumulation will be essential in our tests and the data will provide us with sufficient 
observations per year in each region to carry out our tests. We use BHPS data for the years 1991-2007. 
Throughout the paper, the unit of analysis is the individual.  A family is defined as a single person 
or a couple (and any dependent children they may have).  Any demographic information included in the 
analysis such as age or education relates to the individual. Financial information (income and wealth) is 
defined at the “family unit” level. This means that each individual is assigned the sum of income and 
wealth that they and their spouse have.  We take care to define tenure in terms of the family unit rather 
than the household. In both countries, an individual is defined as an owner or a renter only if they are the 
individual (or the spouse of the individual) responsible for the property. This is to ensure that adults living 
in accommodation with other family members are not lost from the analysis as subsidiary adults in 
households headed by other individuals. Hence an 80 -year-old living rent-free with their adult children in 
an owned property is not defined as an owner (unless they own the property jointly) – they would be 
captured in our “other tenure” group.   
                                                 
1 With the exception of 1992 when house value was only collected for those living at new addresses.   5
 
II. Tenure Status and Tenure Transitions  
2.1 Homeownership rates and tenure transitions at older ages 
Especially at older ages most Americans are homeowners. Based on multiple waves of the PSID 
and BHPS, Table 1 presents tenure status for individuals by age for ten-year age groups starting at age 50, 
concluding with a residual category of those 80 plus years old. To eliminate any differences due to a 
secular trend toward increased home ownership at older ages which exists in both countries, tenure status 
is defined over the same post-1990 time period in both countries. Table 1 shows that more than four in 
five of all Americans over age 50 are homeowners. Fifteen percent of Americans in this age group are 
renters, while a relatively small fraction are in the catch all ‘other categories’ that largely consist of those 
living with relatives or in a nursing home.
2 Among older Americans, there is a decline in the fraction who 
are home owners across age groups after age 70, especially for those above age 80 where the home owner 
rate is only 63%. Most of the decline in the probability of owning a home appears as an increase in 
renting but some of it, particularly among those over age 70, reflects an increase in the likelihood of 
living with others or in a nursing home. 
For British individuals over age 50, the probability of being a homeowner is about twelve 
percentage points lower than that of Americans, a deficit mostly offset by a higher probability of renting. 
There exists a much sharper negative homeownership age pattern in Britain compared to the US in 
Table 1. Among those in their fifties for example, there is about a four percentage point difference in 
home ownership rates between the two countries—by ages 80+ the likelihood of owning a home is 15 
percentage points lower in Britain compared to the US. As documented in Banks et al. (2003), this sharp 
                                                 
2 Both PSID and BHPS understate tenure status of ‘other’ especially those listed in ‘assisted living’ places. When 
they started, both surveys were samples of the non-institutionalized populations, although those who subsequently 
move into nursing homes and other forms of assisted living remain in the survey. The implications of this baseline 
year sampling are obviously greater in the BHPS than in the PSID since 1991 is the baseline year of BHPS. But 
even PSID under-represents the institutionalized population since when given a choice between spouses with one of 
them in a nursing home and the other in a community dwelling the PSID always chooses the later.    6
negative age gradient in home owning rates in Britain largely reflects cohort effects associated with the 
sale at subsidized rates of government owned council housing that made the previous renters now owners.  
2.2 Changes in housing tenure with age 
  The very pronounced cohort effects in housing status in Britain mentioned in the previous section 
indicate that it would be perilous to attempt to read housing transitions from cross-sectional age housing 
tenure patterns, especially in Britain. Instead, in this section the most salient transitions are highlighted 
using the panel nature of the data in the US and Britain. 
Since much of the existing research on downsizing at older ages focuses on the decision to sell 
one’s original home and become a renter (Venti and Wise 2001; Sheiner and Weil 1992), we begin with 
transitions conditional on originally being a homeowner. Table 2 examines these post 1991 tenure 
transitions in the United States (using the PSID) and Britain (using the BHPS) for a sub population who 
are at least 50 years old and who were originally home owners in the initial period.
 3 Because the extent of 
any transitions that take place will depend on the length of the window during which households are 
allowed to adjust their status, the data are presented for five year durations between waves of the panel. 
Table 3 organizes the data in precisely the same way for those who were initially renters. We separate  
transitions in this data by the nature of the tenure transition—i.e., whether to owner or renter in the new 
home, and within these categories by whether the move went across a state line in the United States or 
across one of nine regions in Britain. 
Over a five year period, more than one in every five American home owners who were at least 50 
years old moved out of an originally owned home. Among Americans who did move, however, three-
quarters remained homeowners by purchasing another home. Another 20% of them became renters while 
the rest do a combination of things, including moving in with family members or into group dwellings. 
Mobility among homeowners is clearly less in Britain for older households. Across the same five year 
span, about one in every eight British homeowners relocated compared to about one in five American 
                                                 
3 To the extent that owner occupiers’ retirement-related mobility yields movements outside Britain—to Spain and 
France, as opposed to Florida and Arizona, for example—such transitions are of course not captured in our BHPS 
data although the empirical importance of such transitions in Britain is limited as we discuss briefly below.   7
households. If we extend the horizon over which we examine mobility to ten years instead of five, one in 
every three American home owners would move compared to one in every four British homeowners.  
Table 2 also shows that the majority of moves of home owners take place within the same region or 
state of their original home. In both Britain and the United States, 80% of the moves that homeowners did 
make left them residing in the same region or state of their original residence. 
We turn next to the age pattern of mobility among homeowners. In the United States, amongst 
those who do move, the fraction that do not purchase another home increases with age—at older ages 
American owner occupiers increasingly move into rental properties and to a lesser extent into either 
assisted living or to stay with family members. The probability of a homeowner moving into a rental 
property is far less in Britain than in the US and it is a good deal less likely at older ages for an home 
owner in Britain to subsequently become a renter.  
Table 3 demonstrates—not surprisingly—that renters in both countries are far more mobile than 
owners. Across the five year survey interval, almost two-thirds of American renters moved at least once 
compared to only one-in-five British renters. Once again, the majority of moves amongst American 
renters are within-state residential moves, but this is especially the case when the move is from one rental 
property to another. One in five American moves from rental to owner tenure status is across state lines.   
British renters are far less mobile than their American renter counterparts, a much larger between 
country mobility differential than that which existed among home-owners. In the US, about half of 
originally renting households remained so and simply settle into another rented apartment or flat. But 
around 40% of American renters who do relocate over age 50 subsequently become homeowners. The 
comparable British number is less than half that – eighteen percent. In the US and in Britain, renters 
become increasingly less mobile with age.  Forty-four percent of American renters in their seventies stay 
in the same place over a ten year horizon compared to 33% of American renters in their fifties. Eighty-
nine percent of British renters over age 80 stay in the same place. 
   8
III. FACTORS RELATED TO GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY 
Why is there so much less mobility at older ages in Britain compared to the United States? To 
attempt to address that question, Table 4.a lists summary statistics about the distribution of state level 
attributes that are potentially related to migration across states in the United States while Table 4.b 
displays a similar but not identical array of attributes for regions in Britain. These attributes include 
measures of spatially specific amenities that make a location an attractive place to live or not and the 
economic costs associated with living in one place rather than another. In addition to the mean, our 





th percentile, both expressed relative to the median value. 
There is considerable variation amongst American states in spatial amenities compared to those in 
Britain—in particular mean winter temperature, hours of sunshine in January, and yearly rainfall. For 
example, the January spread between the 90
th and 10
th percentile state is equal to the median temperature 
State- thirty one degrees Fahrenheit. In contrast, in Britain the spread between the coldest and warmest 
region in January is only three degrees Fahrenheit. While the contrast between the two countries in the 
other spatial amenities is not as extreme, in all cases there exists far more diversity in the US compared to 
Britain. In general, and largely due to the much smaller size of the country, these types of spatially 
specific amenities are unlikely to generate much within country migration in Britain as there simply exists 
so little geographic variation that the opportunities to improve your lot through migration are quite small. 
This is clearly not the case in the United States.
4  
Turning to economic variables that might be related to migration, we focus on the following 
dimensions in the US—income taxes and rental and owning price of housing. Once again, there exists 
                                                 
4 One possibility is that migration to Spain or other warmer parts of Europe leads to attrition from the BHPS data 
whereas equivalent migrations take place internally in the US and hence respondents remain in the PSID sample. 
Official statistics on migration show that the total numbers of out migrants age 45 or over was 33,000 in 1991 and 
68,000 in 2006. Given population totals for those aged 45 and over in the same years these equate to outmigration 
rates of 0.015% and 0.028% respectively. Whilst this represents a large increase proportionately over the period of 
our sample, the numbers are far too low to be driving differences observed between mobility rates in the PSID and 
BHPS data. Hence we ignore international mobility for the rest of our analysis.  
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considerable variability across American States especially compared to limited regional variation in 
Britain. Some of this is inherent in governance difference between the two countries in the fiscal role 
assigned to local government units compared to the central government. In the US, income taxes are set at 
both the individual state level and a common federal level and states and local communities can also 
access property, sales, and occasionally income taxes. In Britain, the only major tax set at the local level 
is the council tax. This tax was introduced in 1993 (its predecessor was the community charge or poll 
tax). It is paid by both renters and owners and the level is roughly related to the value of your home. 
Since tax rates vary by income in the United States, we characterize the geographical distribution of 
taxes by a small set of average tax rates per state. These tax rates are computed at four real income levels 
in each year ($20,000; $40,000; $60,000 and $80,000) for each state using the NBER Taxsim program. A 
family is assigned the tax rate closest to their family income. Average tax rates are a more appropriate 
indicator of tax incentives than marginal tax rates in this case since location choices are discrete (see 
Diamond (1980) or Griffith and Devereux (1998)). Not surprisingly, average tax rates by state increase 
significantly with income. Evaluated at the mean, average tax rate at the highest income is 20%, four 
times that at the lowest income group—5% at the lowest income level. For mobility decisions, it is 
variation in average tax rates among states at a given income level that is relevant. For those with low 
incomes, variation in average tax rates across states is relatively small and thus provides little incentive 
for mobility. For example, the difference in average tax rate at the 90
th and 10
th percentile is only 2.5% in 
the lowest income group. Variation in average taxes does increase as income rises. Comparing the 90
th to 
10
th percentile, the difference in average taxes is 6 percentage points in the highest income group 
compared to 2.5 percentage points in the lowest income group.  
Similarly, the average price per room whether computed as house price per room for owners or 
rental price per room for renters varies much more across American states than across British regions. 
Relative to the median, the spread between the 90
th and 10
th percentile in house price per room is 1.4 in 
the United States compared to 0.5 in Britain. Variation in rental prices shows a similar contrast between 
the countries. Using the same metric, relative to the median, the spread between the 90
th and 10
th   10
percentile in rental price per room is 1.6 in the United States compared to 0.50 in Britain. These relative 
housing cost variations are a combination of the composition and quality of dwelling types and the cost of 
the area across the 50 US states or the 12 British regions. 
The final row in Tables 4.a and 4.b captures a different aspect of geographic mobility by showing 
the fraction of rental homes that are subsidized in some way by government. There are two dimensions of 
subsidies that are recorded in the PSID—whether you live in a public housing project and whether a 
government subsidies part of the rent.
5 Families in subsidized housing may be more reluctant to move or 
less able to move whilst retaining their subsidy. In the United States in 1995, about one in four renters 
aged over 50 live in some form of public or subsidized housing but once again there is a great deal of 
variation across states in this proportion.  
In Great Britain, subsidized and public rental accommodation makes up a much larger proportion of 
the rental market particularly for the over fifties. There are two main programs providing financial 
support for housing. Both are aimed exclusively at renters and are means tested. The first is a system of 
subsidized housing, often referred to as local authority, social or council housing.
6 Those who are 
allocated a property will pay a below-market rent and the landlord will be either the local authority or a 
housing association. Individuals who are entitled to such a property are placed on a waiting list until 
suitable accommodation becomes available.
7 Whilst entitlement to live in social housing is subject to a 
strict means test, once allocated a property, tenants can usually stay for life irrespective of any changes in 
circumstance.
8 
The second program of financial assistance for British renters is the housing benefit system which 
was introduced in the late 1980s. This is a substantial component of the British welfare system and is 
                                                 
5 Section 8 Rental Voucher Program increases affordable housing choices for very low-income households by 
allowing families to choose privately owned rental housing. The public housing authority (PHA) generally pays the 
landlord the difference between 30 percent of household income and the PHA-determined payment standard about 
80 to 100 percent of the fair market rent (FMR). The rent must be reasonable. The household may choose a unit with 
a higher rent than the FMR and pay the landlord the difference or choose a lower cost unit and keep the difference. 
6 For more detail of the system of social housing see http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cr/CASEreport34.pdf. 
7 Typically waiting lists are long. Priority is given to groups who are deemed most in need, including households 
which include dependent children, pregnant women, and the mentally ill. 
8 This system is currently under review.   11
simply a cash transfer from the government to the renter. It is not tied to a particular property but it is 
subject to a strict means test. The amount of benefit received is determined by personal circumstances and 
also the characteristics of the property (for example, whether the house is a reasonable size for the 
family). Housing benefit payments may fully cover the total amount of rent or may only partially do so. 
Social renters are also entitled to receive housing benefit if they pass the means test.  
Table 4.b, which shows proportions of renters living in social housing, reveals that 81% of renters 
aged over fifty in Great Britain live in public rental accommodation (either local authority housing or 
housing association housing). The comparable fraction in the United States is only 27%. In Britain, there 
is little escape from the large role played by the public sector in the rental marker as this proportion varies 
from 60% to 90% across the regions. Of those living in social housing, around 50% also receive housing 
benefit (not shown in table). 
  Social renters have a severely reduced incentive and ability to move or to downsize their property 
for several reasons. Even if a tenant’s current circumstances means that they are still entitled to social 
housing, moving can be very difficult because of the shortage of social housing: existing tenants are 
treated in the same way as new applicants, so if they are not in a priority group they may not be allocated 
a different property. For those whose circumstances have changed in such a way that they would no 
longer be entitled to social housing if they were to reapply, there is a large incentive not to move as they 
may not be allocated a different property at all and may have to move into the private sector and pay full 
market rent.  
  Receiving housing benefit may also reduce the incentive to downsize. For tenants who receive 
housing benefit that fully meets the cost of the rent, moving into smaller or cheaper accommodation 
would reduce their housing consumption and would have no offsetting reduction in cost. The disincentive 
to move is somewhat reduced for renters who receive housing benefit that only partially covers the rent, 
although it is still present. Whilst a reduction in housing consumption would lead to a reduction in 
housing costs, this might not be a one-for-one reduction due to the partial subsidy.   12
  Our multivariate analysis will control for both social renting and receipt of full or partial housing 
benefit subsidies. Table 5 highlights large mobility differences among British renters depending on 
whether they are a social or private renter and within these categories depending on the extent of the 
benefit subsidy. Social housing is highly correlated with mobility rates—37% of private renters move 
over a five-year period compared to only 16% of social renters. Among social renters, they least mobile 
are those who are receiving no social benefit and who presumably may have difficultly qualifying for a 
social flat if they moved. Care needs to be taken because there are many other differences across the 
various groups, not least in their average incomes. Hence further discussion will be left to the multivariate 
models of section four. 
 
3.1 Geographical mobility and the changes in amenities for movers 
Even when older householders remain home owners and stay in a home of about the same size, they 
can purchase improved spatial amenities and lower their costs of living by moving to places where 
amenities are better and/or costs are lower. Once one moves to a new place and leaves the old, one buys 
the entire package of amenities and economic costs and benefits of the new location compared to the old. 
It is possible that one may gain in one dimension (a more pleasant climate) at the expense of another (a 
more affordable place to live). 
In this section, we summarize results obtained from our analysis of the change in spatial amenities 
and economic costs associated with mobility among HRS and BHPS respondents who are at least 50 
years old. Due to data limitations, these amenities can only be measured at the region (in Britain) or state 
(in the United States) level even though there are differences in amenities and economic costs associated 
with within-region and within-state moves, especially in the United States. Since the desire for better 
amenities and lower costs may be age dependent, we include in all models a set of age dummies for the 
age intervals 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80 plus. In these models the constant term is suppressed. The 
British data spans years 1991-2007 while the American data spans years 1969-2005.    13
In this analysis, our aim is simply to describe the nature of changes observed in the two datasets. 
However, due to the small number of moves observed, particularly across regions, in some country-age 
cells we want to be sure that any differences are statistically significant. Hence we estimated models with 
a discrete outcome—being either the change in amenity or economic cost associated with a move—and a 
set of categorical age dummies as explanatory variables. In addition, this allows us to make certain that 
our comparative results are not affected by secular trends given that the data in the two countries covers a 
different time period. We therefore include a dummy variable in the American models for the years 1991-
2005, which are the years where BHPS data are available. That dummy variable is never statistically 
significant. 
Table 6 summarizes our results for spatial amenities. We will illustrate our format with mean 
January temperature. A positive number in this table indicates that the area that a person left was colder 
than the area to which they moved—that is, a household was purchasing some additional warmth in the 
winter. Most of the American numbers in Table 6 are positive, indicating that on average American 
movers are going to warmer winter climates. Buying additional warmth during winter months is more 
common among those under 70 years old and is particularly large among those who move during the 
retirement years. Among those 60 to 70 years old, when most retirement-related moves take place in the 
United States, American across state movers ‘purchase’ six and half degrees Fahrenheit warmer winter 
climates. This may well be an understatement given the absence of data within states on amenities. 
Especially around the retirement age span and given the size of some American states, movers may well 
be heading for the warmer, more pleasant areas of the State which often are in the southern most parts. 
Not only is the new location more pleasant, winter heating costs are presumably lower in the new locale. 
For those above age 70, and particularly over age 80, Americans actually move to slightly colder 
winter climates indicating that moves at very old age may reflect quite different motives, such as being 
closer to relatives (moving back to where relatives live) when elderly parents become increasingly frail 
and dependent. Sample sizes are also much lower at these older ages, making the patterns more erratic.   14
Not surprisingly in light of the data presented above in Table 4.b about the lack of variability in 
spatial amenities, our estimated models for Britain show virtually no relation between a region’s winter 
climate and the direction of a move. The estimated coefficients are never statistically significant and are 
as often negative as positive. 
Rainfall does not appear to be an important amenity inducing across region or state migration. 
Annual rainfall generally tends not to be statistically significant. In the three cases where we do find an 
effect, those aged 60-69 in the US and 50-59 in Britain move towards slightly wetter climates, while those 
aged 80+ in Britain move away from such areas. Rainfall is a complicated amenity - while constant rain is 
not a desirable trait, hot dry summers (particularly in the US) are also associated with lower rainfall. 
The other amenity that does appears to matter was hours of January sunshine.
9 American movers 
across states apparently not only desire warmth but also sunlight. For people who move across state, 
January sunlight hours increase by almost seventeen hours in the retirement age span and about nine 
hours for movers in their fifties or seventies. Once again, this pattern disappears among the elderly where 
there is no improved sunshine for those over 80. In Britain, our model shows that once again there is little 
opportunity for gain for the British in terms of sunshine achieved through migration. In fact, among those 
in their fifties the days become a bit darker when people in Britain moved across regions.   
  We next consider in Table 7 changes in costs associated with the move by comparing average 
state housing and rental prices per room of the new location compared to the previous one. To avoid 
confusion in the units associated with switching between owner and rental prices when the move involves 
a change in tenure, prices in the destination location reflect the same type of tenure of the location of 
origin. To illustrate, if the move was from owner to renter, we compare mean state housing (as opposed to 
rental) prices in the two locations. To eliminate the confounding effect of housing price inflation, we 
compare origin and destination housing prices in the wave prior to the actual move. In addition to 
                                                 
9 We examined two other amenities-June relative humidity and July temperature- but did not find an association 
with mobility.   15
modeling these changes in cost per room by tenure status at location or origin, we also estimate models 
separately by whether the transition was to an owner or rental status. 
  In the US, homeowners in the retirement age span apparently move to less expensive places per 
room than those that they left, particularly when they remain owners. Owners who remain owners and 
who are moving across state boundaries are associated with average state costs about one thousand nine 
hundred dollars less per room. In contrast, there appears to be no real association with area specific costs 
per room among renters. Thus, holding the number of rooms constant, owners (but not renters) who 
migrate across state lines do appear to be moving to less expensive states.   
  Similar to the US, it appears that when British owners move when they are less than seventy 
years old, they also on average move to a less expensive region. Essentially at these ages, people are 
moving from the city (expensive) to the country (cheaper). Almost all of this effect is associated with 
moves where the person remained a home owner. In contrast, British renters who move experience no 
statistically significant cost change per room. 
  Especially in the United States, these location specific costs might include income or property tax 
changes which can vary considerably across states and localities. Property taxes are set at the local level 
in the United States so that they are outside the scope of our analysis. As described above, we computed 
average tax rates (combined federal and state) associated with a state for four different income levels with 
people assigned the income bracket closest to their actual income. Since taxes can change both due to a 
change in average income tax rates between the two locations or a change in income of the household, we 
evaluate the impact of changing taxes by holding income constant at the time of the move. By doing so, 
the pure impact of income tax rates can be isolated. 
  Table 8 lists changes in income tax rates associated with a move. For Americans over age 50 but 
under age 70, average state and federal taxes are lower after the move. The changes are relatively small—
a little less than two percentage points. To some extent, the impact of income tax variation is undoubtedly 
understated in these computations due to the use of the only four income brackets to assign tax rates, it 
does not appear at present that this may not turn out to be a primary motive for migration in the pre-and   16
post retirement years. Once again reflecting a pattern seen before, this pattern reverses after age 70 when 
economic factors apparently play less of a role in the migration decision.  
  In sum then, how would we characterize mobility in terms of the overall cost implications for 
housing consumption? We know from Figures 1 and 2 that that Americans, and to a much less extent the 
British, tend to downsize during these ages so that when they move they select smaller homes which by 
itself would make them cheaper. This is true for both owners and renters. This downsizing alone would 
imply that less housing is being consumed and less is being spent on housing. For Americans and British 
homeowners, especially if they remain owners as most do and are less than seventy years old, the price 
per room is also lower in the new location compared to the old augmenting the lower expenditures on 
housing for across region and state moves.  
 
IV. MODELING MOBILITY AT OLDER AGES 
  In this section, we present our full empirical models of mobility at older ages in the US and 
Britain. Reflecting our discussions above, several factors hypothesized to be related to mobility at older 
ages are included in our analysis. These are conceptually organized into four groups—economic, family, 
location specific amenities, and institutional constraints- each of which potentially vary across our spatial 
units which will be States in the US and regions in Britain. Inter-state (or inter-region) migration is 
modeled separately from all moves. 
Individual economic indicators in both countries include the ln of real annual family income and 
education. In the United States education is separated into three groups—13-16 years of schooling, 16 or 
more years of schooling with 12 or fewer years the reference group. In Britain, broadly comparable 
groups are constructed based on educational qualifications—the lowest education (reference) group are 
those with compulsory schooling only, the middle group has some post-compulsory schooling or 
vocational qualifications but less than a college degree, and the final group has college degrees or higher. 
The models also contain measures of individual values of baseline house value, the amount of home   17
equity (for home owners only), and the average amount of inflation adjusted financial assets in the 
family.
10 
In addition to economic indicators measured at the individual level, our mobility models include 
measures of area specific housing costs—either mean rents per room (for renter models) or mean housing 
price per room (for the owner model). In the United States, we include a measure of the average income 
tax rates. As described above, these tax rates were computed based on year, state, and income of 
respondents. 
The probability of moving may be related to work transitions especially those induced by 
retirement that take place at these ages. Therefore, a set of work transitions are entered into the models 
(work-no work, no work-work, no work-no work with work-work as the omitted category). All work 
variables are defined at the individual level but if the family unit is a couple, we include these work 
transitions for both partners.  
  Family related forces include whether there were any demographic transitions in the household in 
terms of marital status, whether any children are at home, and the number of people in the household. 
More specifically, all models have the following sets of demographic variables—a quadratic in age, the 
change in the number of people living in the house, three marital status transitions (married-single, single-
married, single-single with married-married as the omitted group), and children living at home transitions 
(kids-no kids, no kids-kids, no kids-no kids with kids-kids as the omitted group
11). The marital and child 
transition indicators tell us, conditional on changes in number of residents, whether changes in the type of 
resident living in the home matters.  
                                                 
10 In the PSID and BHPS, information on assets is collected every five years so financial assets cannot be a time 
varying variable. We average financial assets (inflation adjusted) over the panel waves of the data and use that as 
our index of the financial liquidity of the family. For the BHPS, changes to question wording between 1995 and 
2000 led to issues of comparability across waves. For this reason, we average financial assets across the two waves 
of data for which we have a strictly comparable measure (2000 and 2005). We include a dummy variable which 
controls for observations with missing wealth (the coefficient is not reported in Tables 9-12). 
11 For Britain, due to lack of observations in “no kids – kids” group, it is combined with “no kids-no kids” group.   18
  While neither PSID nor BHPS have extensive measures of health, they do measure health status 
along the standard five point scale-excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor.
12 Using this information, we 
construct two variables about health change between the waves of the panel- whether your general health 
status improved and whether your general health status got worse. The reference group is that your health 
status remained the same. 
  Based on our results above, our amenity measure is mean temperature in January. Institutional 
factors are meant to capture institutional arrangements in the two countries that may promote or inhibit 
mobility at older ages particularly among renters—whether one lives in public or subsidized housing (in 
the US) or in council housing in Britain. All area specific variables are interacted with age being at least 
70 to gauge whether the influence of such factors vary with age. 
Data used for estimation are based on a sample of individuals ages 50 and more using the PSID for 
the US (years 1968-2005) and the BHPS for Britain (years 1991-2007.)
13 Separate models were estimated 
for owners and renters and all models include a linear time trend. Tables 9 and 11 (for owners) and Tables 
10 and 12 (for renters) list estimated coefficients and associated z statistics obtained from OLS models of 
three types of migration decisions in the US and Britain—the probability of changing residence 
(regardless of destination), the probability of moving across a state or region boundary, and the 
conditional probability of moving across a state or region boundary given that you relocate. All decisions 
are modeled over a one year time frame. 
If we examine first the set of transition variables included in the model for the US (marriage, kids, 
and work), the stable no transition reference group (married-married, kids-kids, and work-work) is 
generally the one least associated with mobility for both owners and renters alike. The transition into 
marriage generates the highest probability of a move, both within and across state moves. For Britain, a 
very similar pattern is found in that the most stable reference group is generally least likely to move, but 
the impacts of the marital transitions on mobility are typically quite smaller.  
                                                 
12 The BHPS question asks about health status relative to others of your own age. 
13 Although BHPS sample began in 1991, data on house value was only collected for those who were interviewed at 
a new address in 1992. Since our models are based on differences, we effectively have data starting in 1993.   19
All ‘kids’ transitions motivate additional mobility both within and across states for renters and 
owners alike in the US. Especially for owners, the transition from no kids to kids in the home is 
associated with a move across states and for higher induced mobility (compared to the other types of kids 
transitions) for renters. This is most likely due to parents moving to their child’s home and place of 
residence as they get older. The effect of these children transitions is once again similar in Britain but not 
as pronounced.  
Work transitions also generate mobility both within and across states for both renters and owners in 
the US and in Britain. This is the case for one’s own work transition and those of one’s spouse or partner. 
The transition from work to non-work by either partner, which in this age group is most likely associated 
with retirement, induces households to move across state and region boundaries, presumably as the link 
between place of work and place of residence is broken. We find little systematic association of changes 
in health with mobility in either country although it is important to remember that the measurement of 
health is not a strength of either the PSID or BHPS. 
We next describe estimated impacts of economic variables. Several dimensions of economic 
resources are measured, including household income, education, house value and home equity among 
home owners, and average financial wealth holdings. In the United States, statistically significant positive 
effects on the probability of moving are estimated for education and income, and higher incomes and 
more schooling are also more likely to generate inter-states moves in the US. Given the phase of the life-
cycle we are examining, income is mostly not a proxy for job market opportunities in alternative labor 
markets.  Instead these income effects are more likely to capture the ability to finance moves or to 
purchase amenities associated with localities that are no longer tied to jobs.  
While average financial assets among American home-owners do not appear to be related to within 
State moves, more financial assets discourage across state moves. One interpretation may be that home-
owners with little financial liquidity (controlling for net equity in their home), relocate in order to achieve 
greater financial liquidity. We find the same effect for across region moves of home owners in Britain and   20
in both countries this effect is mitigated among older people. Greater financial assets encourage renter 
mobility in the United States but have no association with mobility in Britain. 
In Britain, economic status variables—schooling and income—are far less important for mobility 
outcomes than in the US. We find a significant positive effect of education on the probability of moving 
but only for renters. There is no income effect on the probability of moving, either unconditionally or 
conditionally, for owners or renters alike. 
Conditional on being a homeowner, mobility rises with the value of the house but declines with 
home equity when both variables are in the model both in the US and Britain. One interpretation of the 
home value effect (in addition to a normal income effect) is that as the value of home goes up people are 
consuming a lot of housing relative to their income, inducing them to want to downsize their house. 
Conditional of the value of house, an increase in home equity is equivalent to a reduction in the stock and 
flow of mortgage payments, which makes it less likely that people move to reduce those payments. In 
both countries, these house value variables do not affect whether or not the move is inter or intra-state 
(with the exception of a possible positive effect of ln house value on probability of moving regions in 
Britain). 
There are several indicators of the economic costs associated with living in one’s current location—
average income tax rate (US only), council tax rate,
14 cost of housing per room (house price per room for 
owners and rental price per room for renters), and the fraction of rental residents of that state who live in 
public or subsidized housing. Based on transitions tables discussed above, all variables are interacted with 
whether the respondent was 70 years old or older.  
Among owners, higher state or region wide cost per room encourages additional mobility and 
makes it more likely that the move is across states in the United States or regions in Britain. These effects 
become smaller in Britain and for those over 70 years old. Among renters in both countries these effects 
                                                 
14 In Britain we also include a dummy variable to capture the years 1991 and 1992 where the poll tax regime was in 
place.   21
are weaker with the only statistically significant effect being that high rental costs per room encourage 
mobility across regions among British renters.  
Conditional on moving, a high income tax in the origin state encourages additional across state 
mobility among owners. Renters in high tax states are discouraged from moving, although once again if 
they do move it will be across state. 
Finally, a larger fraction of state rental units in public or subsidized housing discourages mobility in 
the US, although this effect is quite small. In Britain, for owners, the fraction living in public housing 
(local authority housing) in a region has a negative effect on the probability of moving. For renters, the 
proportion living in public housing in the region also discourages mobility, but it has a positive effect on 
the probability of moving region both unconditionally and conditionally. When an area is dominated by 
public housing which is often characterized by long queues, it may be very difficult to find alternative 
rental properties unless one is willing to move from the region. 
Given our previous discussion about the possible effect of housing benefit and social renting on 
mobility, we also include individual level dummies in the rental models to indicate whether the individual 
is a Local Authority renter or a housing benefit recipient at either the full 100% rate or a partial rate. It is 
possible (and indeed common) for individuals to live in local authority housing and receive housing 
benefit. The mobility effect of receiving housing benefit in the private sector may be different (where the 
effect on mobility may be smaller, particularly for those receiving partial housing benefit), so we also 
include interactions of receipt of housing benefit and being a Local Authority (LA) renter.  
Looking first at the effect of being an LA renter on mobility we can see that, as expected, being a 
social renter is strongly negatively associated with moving both within and across regions. This effect is 
mitigated to some extent if the social renter also receives a 100% housing benefit or a partial housing 
benefit. Recipients of such housing benefits typically have low current incomes and would have less 
difficulty qualifying for social council housing in another place if they did move. For renters in the private 
sector, receiving 100% housing benefit discourages mobility overall, but encourages cross-region 
mobility. Those receiving 100% housing benefit have no incentive to downsize as they will be consuming   22
less housing with no offsetting reduction in cost. This would explain the negative effect on overall 
mobility. Private market rental coupled with receipt of partial housing benefit is not statistically 
significantly associated with differential mobility, which accords with our earlier discussion that the 
negative incentive to downsize is much less when rent is only partially covered by housing benefit. 
The estimated impacts of amenity variables are more mixed, with only the January temperature 
measure indicating consistent results. In the US higher January temperature deters mobility across states, 
but only for those less than 70, with much stronger effects for owners than for renters. For moves which 
do not go across state boundaries, higher January temperature actually encourages mobility for renters 
and owners alike. As expected, these temperature-related effects are much weaker in Britain.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Housing wealth is a major component of individual retirement resources, and the dynamics of 
housing wealth trajectories at older ages are not well understood. But housing is also durable good 
providing, for homeowners at least, consumption services both contemporaneously and in the future.  
Consequently wealth trajectories need to be analyzed somewhat differently to other forms of wealth 
where one might naturally expect individuals to run down their wealth as they age in order to finance 
consumption in retirement.  
  When looking at trajectories of housing consumption (as measured by number of rooms) or 
housing wealth, differences between the US and Britain are driven not so much by differences in behavior 
of movers, but by differences in proportions of households who move. In this paper, we have investigated 
possible causes of these mobility differences, whether these be constraints in terms of the possible 
improvements that could be had by moving (in terms of climate etc.) or disincentives to move that may be 
inherent in the various national and state-level economic institutions.  
We found a role for geographic, demographic, economic, and social factors that was surprisingly 
consistent across countries. In each case, the magnitude of the underlying variation in factors within each 
country leads to less housing mobility in Britain than the US. For example, whilst subsidized housing   23
disincentivizes mobility in both countries, the higher proportion of subsidized renters in Britain 
(combined with a greater marginal effect of subsidized renting on mobility) leads to considerably less 
mobility in Britain. Similarly, while living in a colder or darker region leads to more mobility at older 
ages in both countries.  The fact that regions differ by only one or two degrees (or one or two hours of 
sunshine) in Britain again leads to less mobility for older British households than for their American 
counterparts where state climate variation is much larger. 
  One obvious omission from our analysis is a measure of geographical proximity to other 
members of the family, and in particular children and grandchildren. While we do not have information 
on this in the individual level data we use in our analysis, the international differences are likely to be 
such that this would be in line with other effects we find. There is less geographical mobility at younger 
ages in Britain than there is in the US, and thus older adults are already closer to their families and their 
children’s families in their working years. Hence if geographical proximity to family is a motivation for 
mobility at older ages, then it is likely to lead to more mobility in the US than in Britain.  
  There are likely to be important consequences of our analysis for understanding consumption 
trajectories at older ages. First, it suggests that in order to understand total consumption trajectories at 
older ages, one needs to first understand constraints placed on housing and location choices and various 
disincentives to housing mobility that might be in place. The institutional constraints on mobility, 
especially in Britain, imply relatively flat housing consumption profiles at older ages. Hence mobility 
choices, constraints, and outcomes may have knock-on effects to non-housing consumption either 
indirectly through the budget constraint (in the case that preferences are such that non-housing 
consumption is separable from housing) or even directly (when preferences are non-separable). 
Understanding consumption and wealth trajectories at older ages is important for policy purposes and 
provides a possible test of the life-cycle model.  
  As an initial investigation into the potential for these impacts on non-housing consumption, 
Figure 3 plots the percent change in non-housing expenditures after age 50 in Great Britain and the 
United States. To calculate these non-housing expenditure profiles we used successive cross sections from   24
the two best consumption micro-data sets in both countries—the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in 
the United States, and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) in Britain over the period 1987-2007. We 
select the cohort aged 55-59 in 1987 (i.e., those born between 1928 and 1932) in each country and plot 
average non-housing expenditures against age as successive random samples of that cohort are 
interviewed in successive years of the relevant surveys. In both countries, these changes are normalized to 
zero at age 50. The Figure demonstrates clearly that non-housing expenditures fall much faster with age 
for this cohort in Britain than they do in the United States. Of course, there are other institutional 
differences between the countries at older ages, especially regarding the much greater subsidies to 
medical expenditures in Britain that would need to be taken into account in a fuller analysis. Nevertheless, 
the Figure does suggest that there may be important implications of differential housing mobility in the 
two countries—especially as induced by their differing institutional subsidies and frictions—for other 
central economic behaviors that are worthy of future research.   25
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Table 1 
Tenure Status for Individuals by Age  
 
United States 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80+  Total  50+ 
Owner 83.6  87.6  82.9  63.1  82.6 
Renter 14.6  10.9  14.2  30.1  15.0 
Other 1.7  1.5  2.9  6.8  2.4 
  
Great Britain 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80+  Total  50+ 
Owner 79.8  73.4  64.5  48.3  70.2 
Renter 17.7  24.2  32.4  45.1  26.6 
Other 2.5  2.3  3.1  6.7  3.2 
 
Source: PSID (1991-2005) and BHPS (1991-2007); Authors’ calculations from weighted 
individual level data. The table reports the fraction of individuals within each age group who own 
a home, rent a home, or have another tenure arrangement (largely living with other family 
members or in an institution such as a nursing home). 





Five year housing transitions by age, owners at baseline 
United States   
50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ Total  50+
   
Owners who remained  owners   
No move  76.6 81.3 78.1 69.3  78.2
Moved within state  15.4 12.4 10.0 6.7  12.8
Moved out of state  4.0 2.9 2.6 1.9  3.3
 
Owners to renters 
 
Moved within state  2.7 1.9 5.6 14.9  3.5
Renter, Moved out of state  0.65 0.54 1.3 1.9  0.78
 
Owners to “other tenure” 
 
Moved within state  0.43 0.77 2.0 4.0  1.0
Moved out of state  0.22 0.25 0.51 1.3  0.34
 
Great Britain 
50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ Total  50+
   
Owners who remained  owners   
No move  85.6 88.9 88.8 89.5  87.5
Moved within region  9.6 7.1 6.3 3.2  7.9
Moved out of region  2.9 2.3 2.4 1.1  2.6
 
Owners to renters 
 
Moved within region  1.3 1.1 1.5 4.6  1.4
Renter, Moved out of region  0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2  0.4
 
Owners to “other tenure” 
 
Moved within region  0.25 0.14 0.35 0.23  0.23
Moved out of region  0.05 0.11 0.11 0.24  0.09
 
Source:  PSID (1991-2005) and BHPS (1991-2007); Authors’ calculations from weighted 
individual level data. Tenure transitions are defined over a five year period among individuals 
who were owners at the beginning of the time interval. These transitions are all defined by the 
end of five year period tenure status based on whether the respondent did not move, moved 
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 Table  3 
Five year housing transitions by age, renters at baseline 
United States   
50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ All  50+
   
Renters who remained  renters   
No move  33.0 35.4 43.8 45.0  37.3
Moved within state  26.2 36.8 33.5 30.0  30.8
Moved out of state  2.5 1.1 1.0 6.4  2.4
   
Renters to owners   
Moved within state  28.6 14.2 12.3 10.4  19.3
Renter, Moved out of state  5.8 7.6 3.4 0.0  5.0
   
Renters to “other tenure”   
Moved within state  3.0 3.9 6.1 7.2  4.4
Moved out of state  0.86 0.89 0.0 1.1  0.73
        Great Britain 
  50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ All  50+
Renters who remained  renters   
No move  72.2 77.5 86.0 89.2  80.0
Moved within region  17.5 16.1 11.8 9.3  14.4
Moved out of region  1.8 2.1 0.7 0.5  1.4
   
Renters to owners   
Moved within region  6.3 3.3 0.8 0.0  3.0
Renter, Moved out of region  1.6 0.1 0.2 0.0  0.5
   
Renters to “other tenure”   
Moved within region  0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0  0.6
Moved out of region  0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.1
 
Source:  PSID (1991-2005) and BHPS (1991-2007); Authors’ calculations from weighted 
individual level data. Tenure Transitions are defined over a five year period among individuals 
who were renters at the beginning of the time interval. These transitions are all defined by the 
end of five year period tenure status based on whether the respondent did not move, moved 
within a state or region or moved across state or region between the beginning and end of the 
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Table 4.A 






Mean January Temperature  6.73 0.99 0.45  61.65 32.03 
Cumulative Inches of Annual rainfall (inches)  7.11 1.03 0.47  59.74 34.27 
Average Tax Rate-Lowest Income
a 0.02 0.54 0.48  0.08 0.05 
Average Tax Rate-Second Lowest  0.01 0.19 0.19  0.16 0.12 
Average Tax Rate-Third Highest  0.12 0.36 0.17  0.19 0.16 
Average Tax Rate-Highest Income  0.16 0.30 0.13  0.24 0.20 
Average Rent per room in1995 ($)  225.00 1.57 0.68  5882.82 1308.95 
Average House Price per room in1995 ($’000)  1.75 1.40 0.52  32.93 15.06 
Fraction of renters in Public or Subsidized 
Housing in1995
c 
0.0 2.25 1.57 1.0 0.27 










January Mid-Temperature  36.32 0.05 0.04  39.56 37.49
Annual rainfall (inches)  23.67 0.89 0.63  59.90 43.33
Average Annual Rent/room in1995 (£)  569.41 0.51 0.26  1715.36 776.86
Average House Price per room-1995 
(£’000) 
12.49 0.50 0.37 26.48 16.86
Fraction of renters in1995  0.18 0.74 0.41  0.40 0.24
Fraction of renters in public Housing in 
1995 
0.61 0.23 0.16 0.91 0.81
Fraction of renters in subsidized Housing 
(private or public) in1995 
0.24 0.51 0.26 0.67 0.46
 
Notes:   January Temperature and annual rainfall were obtained from the World Almanac in the United 
States and from the Met Office ( http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/averages/)  in Britain. 
Average tax rates in the United States were obtained using the NBER Taxsim program evaluated at four 
real income levels ($20,000, $40,000, $60,000 and $80,000 in year 1995) and reflect the federal and state 
tax codes in each year. We assign an individual the average tax rate in that year closest to their annual 
family income. The average rent per room and house price per room are means across the relevant 
geographic areas in 1995 using the PSID and BHPS.  Similarly, the fraction of respondents who were 
renters and the fraction of renters who lived in subsidized or public housing were also computed at state 




Mobility among British Renters 
 
Renter Type  % of Renters  Prob of moving in 
five years 
Social, no benefit  36.8  0.14 
Social, partial benefit  25.7  0.16 
Social, 100% benefit  17.8  0.22 
All social renters  80.3  0.16 
Private, no benefit  10.3  0.35 
Private, partial benefit  2.0  0.34 
Private, 100% benefit  7.5  0.40 
All private renters  19.7  0.37 
 
Note: Social renters in Britain are those who live in public or Council housing. Private renters 
are those who live in private rental housing. We separate each group by whether they receive 
no housing benefit (a cash transfer to renters for housing), a partial benefit, or a 100% benefit.   31
                                                        Table 6 
Change in U.S. and Britain Amenities Associated with Mobility across States or Regions, by age 
 
American Individuals who move states 
 
Change in  January temperature  Annual rainfall  Hours of 
January sunlight 
  coeff t  coeff  t  coeff  t 
50-59 2.679  2.80  1.149  1.43  8.860  2.81 
60-69 6.526  6.18  3.057  3.41  16.704  4.78 
70-79 1.140  0.76  -0.947  0.74  9.098  1.84 
80+ -1.345  0.60  -1.293  0.68  -0.798  0.11 
1991-2005 -0.040  0.04  1.098  1.17  -6.790  1.86 
British Individuals who move regions 
Change in  January temperature  Annual rainfall  Hours of 
January sunlight 
  coeff t  coeff  t  coeff  t 
50-59 -0.094  -0.989 3.743 3.473 -1.541  -3.564
60-69 0.082  0.741 1.881 1.503 -0.483  -0.962
70-79 0.203  1.419 -1.990 -1.221 1.417  2.168
80+ -0.259  -1.150 -7.177 -2.798 1.615  1.569
 
Note: This table shows the estimated change in each location specific amenity associated with moves that 
are across states in the United States or across regions in Britain. The data used are the PSID for years 
1969-2005 and the BHPS for years 1991-2007. The coefficients in each column are from separate models 
of each amenity with age bands as explanatory variables and the constant term suppressed. The American 
model adds a dummy for years 1991-2005 to make test whether there were significant time trends which 
there are not.  
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Table 7 
Change in Costs Per Room Associated with Mobility across Regions or States 
 
United States  All Owners  Owners who remained 
owners 
Owners who became 
renters 
           
 coeff  t  coeff  t  coeff  t 
            
50-59 -27.1  -0.04  127.8  0.13  158.1  0.14 
60-69 -1481.1  -1.83  -1871.3    1.91  856.9  0.49 
70-79 -678.5  -0.64  -391.9  0.25  -582.9  0.38 
80+ -2297.4  -1.42  -1457.3  0.61  -7094.0  2.91 
1991-2005 -7.3  -0.01 -194.4  0.18  0.24  0.00 
            
United States  All renters  Renters who remained 
renters 
Renters who became 
owners 
           
  coeff  t Coeff t  coeff  t 
            
50-59 120.1  0.89  196.9  1.18 77.1  0.25 
60-69 -70.7  -0.48 55.9  0.29  -187.3  0.60 
70-79 180.7  0.72  221.7  0.74 61.7  0.09 
80+ -383.5  -1.17  -407.3  1.24  NC  NC 
1991-2005 -60.9  -0.37  -57.1  0.27  -207.9  0.56 
      
Britain  All renters  Owners who remained 
owners 
Owners who became 
renters 
          
 coeff  t  Coeff  t     
           
50-59 -3534.4  -3.35 -3589.5 -3.20 750.8  0.29
60-69 -3764.7  -3.07 -4192.0 -3.38 -396.5  -0.12
70-79 -272.5  -0.16 -1048.4 -0.62 (3600.2)  0.82
80+ (4089.38)  1.33 (1146.0) 0.26 (4472.8)  1.00
            
Britain  All renters  Renters who remained 
renters 
Renters who became 
owners 
           
  coeff  t Coeff t  Coeff  t 
50-59  25.1 0.29 -77.0 -0.97 (198.6) 0.82
60-69  -113.5 -1.33 -123.6 -1.72 (-198.5) -0.60
70-79  -75.9 -0.74 (-89.9) -1.08 (-18.6) -0.05
80+ (-48.3)  -0.27 (-60.5) -0.45 NC  NC 
NC = no cases. 
 
Note: This table lists the estimated change in location-specific housing costs associated with each 
move that was across states in the United States or across regions in Britain. When a move changes 
type of tenure (such as owner-renter or renter-owner) we evaluate the new location cost at the 
tenure type pre move. Individuals changing tenure from owning or renting to “other” are not 
reported as a separate group. To eliminate the confounding effect of housing price inflation, we   33
compare origin and destination housing prices in the wave prior to the actual move. The data used 
are the PSID for years 1969-2005 and the BHPS for years 1991-2007. The coefficients in each 
column are from separate models of housing costs with age bands as explanatory variables and the 
constant term suppressed. The only explanatory variables are the age bands with the constant term 
suppressed. The American model adds a dummy for years 1991-2005 to make test whether there 
were significant time trends which there are not. Numbers in parentheses indicate cells with less 




Change in U.S. Tax Rates Associated with Mobility 
Individuals who moved across states 
 
  Income Tax Rate 
 coeff  t 
    
50-59 -0.018  -6.06 
60-69 -0.018  -5.42 
70-79 -0.015  -3.35 
80+ 0.001  0.19 
1991-2005 0.002  0.66 
 
Note: Data used are the PSID for years 1969-2005. Coefficients 
reported are from a model for change in tax rates where the only 
explanatory variables are the age bands with the constant term 
suppressed and a dummy for the years 1991-2005. Average tax rates 
in the United States were obtained using the NBER Taxsim program 
evaluated at four real income levels ($20,000, $40,000, $60,000 and 
$80,000 in year 1995) and reflect the federal and state tax codes in 
each year. We assign an individual the average tax rate in that year 
closest to their annual family income in the year of the move for the 
origin and destination state. 
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Table 9 
OLS  Models of the Probability of Moving Between Waves—United States 
One Year Horizon—Owners 
 
  Any mobility  Cross-state mobility  Cross-state mobility 
if a mover 
 Coeff z Coeff z  Coeff z
Education 13-15 baseline  .00935 3.52 .00382 2.71  .02686 1.34
Education > 16 baseline  .01277 4.83 .00668 4.44 .05181 2.46
Year at baseline  .00092 7.36 .00025 3.71 -.00245 2.92
Age  -.00283 9.16 -.00016 1.10  .00442 2.06
Age squared  .00009 8.96 3.99e-06 0.99  -.00015 2.87
> age 70  -.01734 1.91 -.01226 2.44  -.07600 0.98
ln income at baseline  .00633 4.80 .00420 7.40 .02880 3.55
Negative income  .06335 4.44 .03590 6.18 .28156 3.42
Married/single  .12619 11.68 .02005 4.23  -.01193 0.41
Single/married  .28088 11.89 .04638 4.04  -.02364 0.67
Single/single  .02682 10.70 .00464 4.09  -.01040 0.52
Kids/no kids  .04941 5.37 .01466 3.10  .07734 1.90
No kids/kids  .03728 5.02 .00471 1.39 .01393 0.26
No kids/no kids  .02359 8.49 .00652 4.43  .00980 0.37
Change in household size  -.01247 5.24 -.2.42e-06 0.00  .01511 2.53
Work/not work  .04035 8,94 .02130 7.60 .13246 4.80
Not work/work  .01793 3.29 .01216 3.82 .13948 3.34
Not work/not work  .01337 6.50 .00821 7.60 .08785 4.79
Partner Work/not work  .03435 7.01 .02002 6.19 .13414 3.77
Partner Not work/work  .00990 1.82 .00713 2.18  .06714 1.24
Partner Not work/not work  .01281 6.27 .00561 5.31  .02178 1.07
ln house value (baseline)  .00477 2.82 .00147 1.98  .00309 0.33
ln home equity (baseline)  -.01575 9.76 -.00350 4.74  -.00031 0.04
(Have negative home equity)  -.05860 9.07 -.01555 5.46  -.00748 0.23
Average financial assets  1.07e-06 0.57 -1.97e-06 3.36 -.00004 5.51
>70 x Average financial assets  -4,30e-06 0.90 2.07e-06 1.08  .00003 1.38
Health got better  .00617 1.94 .00136 0.79  01583 0.48
>70 x Health got better  -.00408 0.69 -.00110 0.36  .04930 0.82
Health got worse  -.00045 0.15 .00082 0.50  .00329 0.10
>70 x Health got worse  -.00155 0.29 -.00337 1.24  -.02229 0.41
Mean January temperature  .00024 2.79 -.00006 1.41  -.00227 3.33
>70 x Mean January temp  .00028 1.63 .00019 2.08  .00224 1.78
Cost of housing per room  7.56e-07 4.67 1.59e-07 1.85 3.12e-06 2.37
>70 x Cost of housing per room  7.44e-08 0.26 3.27e-07 1.95  -3.64e-07 0.17
Average tax rate  .02219 1.25 .00999 1.23  .30021 2.10
> 70 x Average tax rate  -.04341 1.19 -.00451 0.22  .04347 0.14
Public or subsidized housing  -.01031 2.19 -.00138 0.55 -.00949 0.23
>70 x Public or sub housing  .00659 0.66 .00354 0.64  .02677 0.32
Constant  -.06330 4.57 -.04815 7.51`  -.16988 1.83
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Table 10 
OLS Models of the Probability of Moving Between Waves—United States 
One Year Horizon—Renters 
  Any mobility  Cross-state mobility  Cross-state mobility 
if a mover 
 Coeff z Coeff z  Coeff z
Education 13-15 baseline  .04092 3.86 .00348 0.85 .00759 0.46
Education > 16 baseline  .03031 2.28 .02254 3.32 .05930 2.33
Year at baseline  .00460 10.50 .00059 3,68  -.00022 0.36
Age  -.00600 6.66 -.00034 1.05 .00167 1.07
Age squared  .00007 3.23 .00001 1.37 -.7.67e-06 0.19
> age 70  .03833 1.26 .00287 0.27  -.03458 0.57
ln income at baseline  .01350 3.78 .00578 4.40 .01345 2.13
Negative income  .08054 2.34 .05166 4.23 .15259 2.52
Married/single  .22107 8.03 .03366 2.48  .00935 0.28
Single/married  .28464 8.22 .03613 2.35  .02945 0.87
Single/single  .01593 1.93 .00381 1.33 .00270 0.19
Kids/no kids  .17973 5.53 .01898 1.40 .00213 0.07
No kids/kids  .06181 2.58 .02443 2.40 .08001 1.94
No kids/no kids  .04162 3.67 .01726 4.58 .04877 2.84
Change in household size  -.00861 1.56 -.00476 1.59  -.01209 1.55
Work/not work  .12031 7.95 .04781 6.06 .11729 4.91
Not work/work  .08075 4.20 .02693 3.14 .06482 2.27
Not work/not work  .03203 4.30 .01257 4.61 .03904 2.87
Partner Work/not work  .07355 3.04 .04169 3,20 .10819 2.54
Partner Not work/work  .03852 1.36 .05365 3.00 .18862 3.06
Partner Not work/not work  -.09933 1.02 .00542 1.49  .02888 1.43
Average financial assets  .00010 2.57 .00004 2.18  .00001 0.25
> 70 x Average financial assets  -.00007 0.94 -.00003 1.32  .00002 0.21
Health got better  .03135 2.21 -.00049 0.09 -.02110 0.88
> 70 x Health got better  -.00924 0.44 .00591 0.75  .05566 1.27
Health got worse  .00621 0.47 -.00247 0.48  -.01634 0.66
> 70 x Health got worse  .01867 0.97 .00887 1.24  .02905 0.78
Mean January temperature  .00187 5.50 .00018 1.44 -.00032 0.61
>70 x Mean January temp  -.00148 2.53 -.00005 0.23 .00111 1.02
Cost of housing per room  -1.69e-06 1.23 6.14e-07 0.34  2.73e-06 0.40
>70 x Cost of housing per room  .00001 1.76 -1.05e-07 0.04  -3.87e-06 0.33
Average tax rate  -.25411 3.67 .06372 2.23  .58293 4.07
> 70 x Average tax rate  -.17583 1.23 -.11112 2.07 -.47822 1.37
Public or subsidized rent  -.02048 0.99 .01122 1.33  .04268 1.20
>70 x Public or sub rent  .05703 1.62 -.01481 1.17  -.07370 1.06
Public or subsidized housing  -.05294 5.04 -.01318 4.40  -.04159 2.57
>70 x Public or sub housing  00646 0.42 .00962 2.06  .01626 0.58
Constant -.11806 2.80 -.08888 5.61  -.15780 2.23
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Table 11. OLS Models for Mobility of Owners—Britain (One Year Horizon—Owners) 
 
   Prob Moving  Prob Move X region 
Conditional X 
Region 
Educated to A-level standard  .00748 2.44 .00186 1.28 .01254 0.31
Educated to Higher Education level  -.00479 -1.74 .00113 0.87  .09343 2.30
Year at baseline  .00047 0.83 -.00019 -0.72 -.00668 -0.73
Age  -.00688 -4.95 -.00200 -3.03  -.00796 -0.39
Age squared  .00005 4.56 .00001 2.70  .00005 0.31
> age 70  -.07609 -0.63 -.04165 -0.73 -.49904 -0.26
ln income at baseline  -.00190 -1.03 -.00037 -0.43 -.00469 -0.20
Negative income  -.01811 -0.49          
Married/single  .05279 5.72 .00867 1.98  -.11392 -1.31
Single/married  .26011 14.26 .04748 5.49  -.13425 -1.45
Single/single  .01126 4.43 .00037 0.31 -.05996 -1.62
Kids/no kids   .02004 2.05 .00494 1.06 .09259 0.72
No kids/no kids or No kids/kids  .01139 2.31 .00593 2.54  .10367 1.37
Change in household size  .00660 2.48 .00154 1.22 -.00213 -0.10
Work/not work  .03184 6.80 .01873 8.43 .22597 4.26
Not work/work  .00993 1.56 .00498 1.65 .15652 1.84
Not work/not work  .00906 3.26 .00699 5.30 .13912 3.34
Partner Work/not work  .03091 6.21 .01698 7.19 .18072 3.00
Partner Not work/work  .00358 0.53 .00581 1.82  .21188 2.36
Partner Not work/not work  .00827 3.01 .00499 3.83 .10856 2.53
Ln House Value (baseline)  .02432 5.81 .00450 2.27  .01170 0.22
ln home equity (baseline)  -.02078 -5.74 -.00351 -2.04  -.00174 -0.04
Have negative home equity  -.22404 -5.25 -.03598 -1.78 -.21004 -0.42
Average financial assets £'000  -.00004 -1.57 -.00002 -2.13 -.00034 -0.99
> 70 x Average financial assets  .00009 2.32 .00005 2.73  .00081 1.46
Health got better  -.00237 -0.79 -.00107 -0.75 .01754 0.40
> 70 x Health got better  .00172 0.33 .00261 1.05 .04447 0.54
Health got worse  -.00045 -0.15 -.00131 -0.90 -.01847 -0.43
> 70 x Health got worse  .00905 1.62 .00435 1.65 .02634 0.34
Mean January temperature  -.00247 -1.38 -.00114 -1.34 -.00484 -0.19
>70 x Mean January temp  .00173 0.60 .00094 0.68 .01409 0.31
Cost of housing per room, £annual  2.57E-07 1.36 6.36E-07 7.07 1.74E-05 6.68
>70 x Cost of housing per room  -2.16E-07 -0.79 -3.95E-07 -3.03 -1.10E-05 -2.62
Band council tax rate in region  .00000 -0.29 -1.65E-05 -2.16 -.00057 -2.15
> 70 x Band council tax rate  -5.23E-06 -0.46 5.74E-06 1.05 .00025 1.33
% in Local Authority housing  -.03257 -2.69 -.00160 -0.28 .34538 1.87
>70 x % in Local Authority housing  .01340 0.60 .00799 0.75 -.04767 -0.14
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Table 12. OLS Models for Mobility of Renters—Britain (One Year Horizon—Renters) 
   Any mobility  Cross-region mobility  Cross-Region if a mover 
Educated to A-level standard  .03228 2.84 .00591 1.61  .02187  0.46
Educated to Higher Education level  .04314 3.72 .02003  5.35  .14182  2.78
Year at baseline  -.00079  -0.60 -.00081  -1.90  -.01232  -1.54
Age  -.00663 -2.45 .00010 0.11  .00450  0.31
Age squared  .00005 2.53 .00000 -0.17  -.00004  -0.36
> age 70  .25157  0.98 .16672  2.01  1.25875  0.79
ln income at baseline  .01035 1.96 .00157 0.92  -.02145  -0.81
Negative income  .12573  1.64        
Married/single .07178  3.52 -.01373  -2.09  -.18870  -2.26
Single/married  .25159 6.51 -.00207 -0.17  -.04662  -0.47
Single/single .00023  0.04 -.00286  -1.70  -.05126  -1.57
Kids/no kids   .01426  0.54 -.00325  -0.38  -.05158  -0.42
No kids/no kids or No kids/kids  .00237  0.19 .00654  1.59  .05347  0.85
Change in household size  .02619 3.84 -.00331 -1.50  -.01611  -0.78
Work/not work  .05400 3.96 .01219  2.76  .03450 0.61
Not work/work  .01077  0.62 -.00377  -0.67  -.04025  -0.45
Not work/not work  .01396  1.79 .00226  0.90  .00569  0.13
Partner Work/not work  .06453 3.97 .01900  3.62  .03093 0.49
Partner Not work/work  .03958 1.94 -.00465  -0.70  -.02483 -0.29
Partner Not work/not work  -.00341 -0.40 .00010 0.04  -.00732  -0.15
Average financial assets £'000  -.00007 -0.85 .00002 0.86  .00015  0.24
> 70 x Average financial assets  -.00025 -1.60 -.00005  -0.93  .00229  0.85
Health got better  .00295 0.37 .00088  0.34  .00855  0.20
> 70 x Health got better  .01023 0.91 -.00145  -0.40  -.01311 -0.19
Health got worse  .01038 1.30 .00228  0.88  .01917  0.46
> 70 x Health got worse  .00774 0.67 .00144  0.38  .03939  0.59
Mean January temperature  .00975 2.21 .00364  2.55  .02730 1.13
>70 x Mean January temp  -.00795  -1.28 -.00376  -1.88  -.02600  -0.69
Cost of housing per room, £ annual  .00000  -0.96 .00000 4.06  .00001 4.47
>70 x Cost of housing per room  .00000  0.95 .00000  -0.34  .00000  0.59
Band council tax rate in region  4.48E-05 1.14 9.33E-06  0.73  -5.29E-05 -0.23
> 70 x Band council tax rate  -2.26E-05  -1.15 -9.01E-06  -1.42  -.00017  -1.46
% in Public or subsidized housing  -.07888 -2.35 .03568 3.28  .68438  4.05
>70 x % in Public or sub housing  .04051  0.82 -.02313  -1.46  -.28481  -0.98
Local authority renter  -.07701 -9.46 -.00571  -2.17  -.00753 -0.19
100% HB recipient  -.02368 -2.23 .01215 3.54  .11840  2.77
Partial HB recipient  -.02922  -1.69 -.00533  -0.95  -.02203  -0.29
100% HB recipient*LA renter  .04789 3.82 -.00645 -1.59  -.03486  -0.58







Note:  Figure 1 depicts change in number of rooms across age groups normalized to zero change in age 
band 50-54. These changes are provided based on a model that only includes age dummies for each age 
band, and a model that also includes measures of changes in family composition for spouse and children 
living at home and changes in employment status. These models are estimated using PSID and BHPS data 






Note: See notes to Figure 1 
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Figure 3 














































Notes: Figure 3 shows the percentage change in spending on non-housing items of expenditure 
by age, normalized at age 58. Data for Britain is based on data from the Expenditure and Food 
Survey and its predecessor the Family Expenditure Survey and data for the US is based on the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey. Data from both countries covers the period from 1987 to 2007. 
 